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The practical failure of the qualified electronic
signature across Europe is a good lesson on the
factors that are critical for information security in
public administration and business: the need for
well defined objectives, the differentiation of
security services, interoperability and a design
approach based on risk management. The
qualified electronic signature (QES)1 and the
global electronic services market have existed for
some time now, but each seems to exist in
parallel realities.
People buy goods and services over the internet all the
time with other forms of electronic signature (such as
the ‘I accept’ icon, by ticking a box, or typing a name
into an e-mail2), but the market for QES only seems to
serve itself, and there is little connection between sales
of goods and services over the internet and the use of a
QES. E-government is widely available in some
countries, but not in those that took the QES approach.
In this article, the author offers an opinion as to how
this happened, based on a decade of experience in
consulting on information security with a special focus
on authentication and the digital signature (the digital
signature is also called an ‘advanced electronic
signature’ in the EU Directive), commenting and
observing legislation and what actually happens in 
this field.
Interoperability issues with the qualified
electronic signature 
Directive 1999/93/EC is a good legal framework for the
QES, but its high-level and abstract nature was one
factor that largely attributed to its failure. This Directive
resulted in a number of different laws by Member States
that are incompatible at a technical and semantic level.
The first challenge was the selection of signature and
document formats for qualified electronic signatures. At
the time the directive was enacted, there were two well-
established and standard signature formats available:
PKCS#7 and CMS – now called CAdES (ETSI 101 733)
and initial drafts of XAdES (ETSI 101 903).3 When newly
established certification authorities and software
houses (often the same entity), encouraged by the new
legislation, started to design their certification services,
they had to make decisions on appropriate formats. But
the problem was that in 2002 this sector seemed to
have no idea what anyone would be going to use the
QES for, except for a very general (and very optimistic)
buzz of having a lot of e-everything in front of every
word (e-government, e-business, e-banking, etc).
Technical products developed at that time – with no
specific business problem that needed to be solved –
and submitted greatly to the pan-European format mess
that we are now enjoying. Having no specific objective,
companies designed the most general solutions they
could think of (‘sign something’), and QES became an
example of the common wisdom that something
By Paweł Krawczyk
1 The qualified electronic signature is a construct
that merges from a combination of the application
of Annex I, Annex II, Annex III and Annex IV of the
Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a
Community framework for electronic signatures,
OJ L 013, 19/01/2000 P. 0012 – 0020.
2 For case law across the globe on these and other
forms of electronic signature, see Stephen Mason,
Electronic Signatures in Law (2nd edn, Tottel,
2007).
3 For an exhaustive list of standards relating to
digital signatures, see appendix 3 in Stephen
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designed to do everything is not good at doing
anything. For example, four Polish certification
authorities that existed at that time all produced a
generic ‘sign-a-byte-stream’ program4 that allowed the
user to create a detached signature (figure 1) or embed
the file inside a signed container (figure 2).
Surprisingly, each of the companies chose a different
signature format,5 and this simple decision has
prevented any possible intra-country interoperability for
years. If the reader wonders how this happened with
four companies and just three formats allowed by law,
here is the solution: one of them used XAdES, one used
CAdES and two used PKCS#7 for a signature, but in a
different file container.
This is how the situation looked like in 2005. As hard
to believe as it is, in 2008 there were already fourteen
formats available on the Polish market, and each of the
four initial formats evolved by changing minor details,
plus a few new ones were added by small companies
fortunate enough to win bids from the public
administration. Out of the fourteen formats, only one
pair was interoperable. For example, three products on
the market used XAdES format to output signed files,
but all used different file extensions (.sig, .xml, .xades),6
although it might be correct to say that it was likely that
each could open the other’s files. To add even more
confusion, the .sig extension seemed very popular – at
the same time four products used it do name their
output files, but they used different formats inside.7 As
a result of these two trends, virtually every application
was enclosed in its own format and extension, even if
some of them could have been interoperable.
From the functional point of view, it is not important
to select the best format, because where a single format
is agreed between all the parties, it will then be
numerous enough to create a critical mass in a given
sector.8 Most specific business functions that might be
required can be achieved using any of the available
formats, even if it is considered ‘old’, such as PKCS#7,
and does not have any ‘modern’ features. Looking back
over the previous years, it seems as if there were
endless technical academic discussions on minor and
relatively unimportant aspects of the QES that caused
different companies to choose different formats to do
the same thing. As a result, useful facilities such as the
ability to use minor security-enhancing features
prevented people from tackling the much bigger issue
of interoperability and usefulness. A rare example of
such interoperability was where several countries chose
the same signature format (PKCS#7) and the same
extension (.p7m) as their basic container for digitally
signed files. As result, it was, for example, possible to
take a file created by an Italian application and open it
in a German application – which is the purpose of
interoperability.
4 A digital signature may be applied to data in a
number of ways. The signature may be an
integral part of the electronic document structure
(format) and cover specific parts of the content.
This is usually the case with document formats
that are equipped with digital signature formats
by design (e.g. PDF, ODF, OOXML). A more
generic case is when a digital signature algorithm
treats the input file as raw binary stream of data.
The first technique is more flexible and it may, for
instance, allow changes to some parts of the
document (e.g. an electronic form where only the
form layout is protected but the user is allowed to
change fields). The latter would verify integrity of
the file as a whole and not allow any changes.
5 A signature format is a standardised order in
which the technical details of a digital signature
are stored in a file. Examples of signature format
are PKCS#7, XAdES, CadES and OpenPGP. They
differ in their technical details (e.g. XadES stores
data as textual XML data, while all the others
stores data as binary), and often by security
features that are standardised in the format (the
functional differences are often very subtle:
usually these standards are built like catalogues
of features that the developers can choose from,
depending on what they need. For example, a
developer that needs just a basic signed
container for his data could use PKCS#7, which is
the oldest available format. If he needed a long-
term archival, he would prefer CAdES or XAdES,
because these formats have this feature
standardised. Or, he could implement this feature
by himself using generic PKCS#7 features). The
signature data in a chosen format may be stored
in another file, separate from the signed data (a
detached signature), or it may be stored together
with the signed data in one file (an embedded
signature). The outermost file format that is
visible to the user is called a ‘file container’. An
example is the PDF format which may contain
user data and an embedded digital signature in
PKCS#7 format.
6 A file extension is merely a label, part of file
name, that does not interfere with the contents of
the file, but allows applications to quickly
determine what file format they should expect
inside the file and how to handle it. If the file
extensions were changed manually in the
scenario described, it is likely that they would
start to open properly in other programs –
obviously that is not something that can be
expected from an end user. File extensions are
not standardized, and a designer decides which
extension to use because of tradition and
personal preferences. For example, the .doc
extension has been traditionally associated with
Microsoft Word, but it is not exclusively assigned
to the program.
7 Paweł Krawczyk, ‘Tabela kompatybilności
formatów podpisu elektronicznego w Polsce’, 19
March 2008, a technical article published on
IPSec.pl and available at http://ipsec.pl/firmy/
2008/ kompatybilnosc-formatow-podpisu-
elektronicznego-w-polsce-bliska-zeru.html.
8 Deciding which format is the best to use depends
on establishing the purpose. If this is not agreed,
the dispute on the features to be given to a
format can easily slip into pointless discussion
using irrelevant arguments.
WHEN THE EU QUALIFIED ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE BECOMES AN INFORMATION SERVICES PREVENTER
9© Pario Communications Limited, 2010 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 7
All the generic ‘sign-a-byte-stream’ applications have
yet another problem – they are all autonomous, single-
function applications, and do not integrate with any
other technology, and are barely usable. All a user can
do is to run the application, open a file, click through
several screens loaded with technical and legal
information, and either click to ‘sign’ or ‘verify’ a file
created in another application. This is how most
applications of qualified electronic signatures sold by
certification authorities for users in Europe work.
If the current model of QES is considered in relation to
ergonomics and ease of use, it can be equated to early
Windows as we remember it from the 1990s. Technical
excellence (at least theoretical technical excellence9 ),
compliance with the requirements of CWA 1435510 and
the general lack of any idea what the applications
should be actually be signing, made them difficult to
understand for anyone without a strong technical
background (and having a legal background did not
necessarily mean that a lawyer or judge understood the
complexities of the QES).11 This is a perfect example on
how ignoring the human factor in the design of the
system rendered a perfectly secure architecture (at least
theoretically12) unusable. Potential users declined to
consider using the QES, and used WinZip if they wanted
a generic file archive, and possibly SecureZIP, if they
wanted enhanced security features. In addition, if a user
wanted to produce an electronic document with an
embedded signature, then they would rather consider
the digital signature features in MS Office, Open Office
or Adobe Acrobat, although these are not suitable for a
QES, for the reasons explained below. 13
Parallel worlds, parallel applications 
A great deal of paper was used and words expended on
the meaning of the important sentence dealing with
‘sole control’ of the signatory in Directive 1999/93/EC.14
The main consequence of these disputes was a set of
very strict technical requirements for signature creation
devices and applications that were subsequently refined
in a series of CEN Workshop Agreement (CWA) and
European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) technical standards. These requirements
effectively prevented the use of such applications as MS
Office, Open Office or Adobe that supported digital
signatures, conveniently embedded in their electronic
document formats, but not in the way required by the
CWA or ETSI.15 In addition, since the specific
requirements are all slightly different in each of the
Member States of the EU, it is virtually impossible to
make a product that complies with all of them.16 This
converted the EU QES market into small national
enclaves, with local companies guarding their local
interpretations and regulatory secrets.
As for the general architecture of the QES, Estonia is a
notable exception from the negative trend. In Estonia,
9 In Poland, the QES was marketed as a ‘secure
signature’. In 2005 the antivirus vendor G DATA
publicly demonstrated how to subvert a popular
QES application to sign a false content so that
different data was presented to the user and
different data was sent to the card for signing.
This resulted in a very nervous reaction of the
vendor, that accused the company of spreading
fear, uncertainty and doubt, and argued that a
‘secure signature’ is not secure in general but
‘secure in the legal sense’. [Editor’s comment: it
would not be secure in the legal sense either].
10 CEN Workshop Agreement (CWA) 14355,
‘Guidelines for implementation of Secure
Signature-Creation Devices’, 2004, European
committee for Standardisation.
11 Editors note: most lawyers across the globe still
do not understand the basic elements of
electronic signatures yet.
12 According to the Polish technical regulation of the
QES (Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 7
sierpnia 2002 r. w sprawie określenia warunków
technicznych i organizacyjnych dla
kwalifikowanych podmiotów świadczących usługi
certyfikacyjne, polityk certyfikacji dla
kwalifikowanych certyfikatów wydawanych przez
te podmioty oraz warunków technicznych dla
bezpiecznych urządzeń służących do składania i
weryfikacji podpisu elektronicznego (Dz. U. z dnia
12 sierpnia 2002 r.) a ‘public’ signature creation
software requires a ‘trusted channel’ (paragraph
4.4). That is, a security feature that can prevent
the modification of data in transit as it is read
from file and sent to the technical component
(smart card) for signature (this was the basis of
the G DATA attack in 2005). Unfortunately the
‘public software’ (paragraph 2.9) is defined in
such way that it excludes virtually any software
used at home or in the office (and nothing else is
left). From a business point of view, the objective
of this requirement is obvious – no general-
purpose operating system (such as Windows or
Linux or MacOS) can offer such a feature in the
strict sense, so having it in force would prevent
anyone from using QES on these systems. From
an engineering point of view, however, this is a
clear sign that the regulators had no idea what
they were going to use the technology for and
what they are trying to protect from.
13 Note the discussion on this topic by Nicholas
Bohm, ‘Watch what you sign!’, Digital Evidence
and Electronic Signature Law Journal, 3 (2006) 45
– 49.
14 Directive 1999/93/EC, Article 2, item 2c requires
that an ‘advanced electronic signature’ is
‘created using means that the signatory can
maintain under his sole control’. The technical
interpretation of this phrase was discussed in
CWA (14355, 14365), ETSI TS (102 042) and FESA
(Forum of European Supervisory Authorities for
Electronic Signatures) statements (2004, 2005).
For an exposition on this point in legal terms, see
Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (2nd
edn, Tottel, 2007) 4.6 and 4.9.
15 More precisely, this was the case for those
jurisdictions that required a qualified electronic
signature with a qualified certificate and a secure
signature creations device (SSCD in CWA 14169
terms) and where signature creation application
(SCA) was regulated (a declaration of compliance,
as required by the Polish electronic signature act
from 2001). In Poland, the SSCD itself was defined
as hardware (a smart card) plus software. The
problem with this approach was that while it may
be considered by some that the security inherent
in a smart card is substantial (until it is lost or
stolen), the added value of an SCA is much
smaller. At the same time, the administrative and
legal burden has increased significantly, because
new, QES compliant programs must be created
and the user cannot use those they previously
used on a daily basis any more.
16 A good example of the impossibility of making a
globally available application that complies with
all the relevant QES regulations is that of Adobe
Acrobat, which introduced increased support for
the functions required to enable the product to be
compliant to QES in version 8. The product
included an internal ‘library’ of options typically
required by different EU Member States. This, it
was hoped, would ensure compliance with local
requirements. But this was not sufficient for the
German regulations, which required a dedicated
option to change between ‘shell’ or ‘chain’
validation models and special ISIS-MTT object
identifiers (this can only be configured by an
administrator by registry modifications, so the
user does not see them).
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the government implemented a reasonably complete
and consistent product (DigiDoc), which started from
clearly defined objectives, an open technical
specification, software packages and an internet portal.
In addition, an attempt was made to invite others to
consider interoperability by publishing an open
implementation (OpenXAdES17). Another helpful move in
right direction is PDF Advanced Electronic Signatures
(PAdES) (ETSI TS 102 778). PAdES is interesting because
it is a format that tries to solve a specific problem:
secure delivery and long-term storage of electronic
documents,18 and it can also help with providing for
technical interoperability.19 Introduced ten years after
Directive 1999/93/EC, implementing this standard
would require the gradual reversal of all local
inventions, which may take another decade to
complete. At the time of the Directive, the technical
nature of the concept of the digital signature was based
on the X.509 security framework, and this model may
no longer be interesting for anyone except for
companies earning income from endless consulting and
analysis of the Directive 1999/93/EC model.20 
Hardware limitations
The requirement to use a secure signature creation
device (SSCD), or a cryptographic card for a QES also
seems to be a significant barrier for most users. This is
the main method to satisfy the requirements of article
2(2) of Directive 1999/93/EC for the signature device to
remain under the sole control of the signatory:
2. ‘advanced electronic signature’ means an electronic
signature which meets the following requirements:
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can
maintain under his sole control; and
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a
manner that any subsequent change of the data is
detectable;
As pointed out by Mason, this is not a definition, but a
number of characteristics relating to performance.21 This
is one of the basic assumptions of the QES security
model, although in many cases it is not necessary for a
QES to have a SSCD. The problem is, that requiring a
QES to have a SSCD without fully understanding the
consequences of complex hardware and software
dependency is one of the factors that have made digital
signatures and qualified electronic signatures
exceedingly difficult to use.22 However, there is a flaw in
the characteristics relating to the advanced electronic
signature, as pointed out by Brazell and Mason – that is,
a digital signature cannot meet the requirements of the
first characteristic, that of being ‘uniquely linked to the
signatory’.23 This is because it can only be linked to the
private key of the signatory, and no person is capable of
memorising the private key. This means the private key
must be retained on a computer, disk or smart card. This
is what is meant by ‘means that the signatory can
maintain under his sole control’. The problem is, a
person cannot control the private key. If the private key
is on a smart card, the card can be lost, stolen or
‘borrowed’.24 If the private key is on a computer, a
malicious third party can obtain access to it and, once
they have obtained the password, us it as they wish. In
electronic signature engineering, the ‘link to the
signatory’ is explained as follows: theoretically, only one
copy of the private key exists, and it is usually created
by the certification authority and issued to the signatory
for their use. It is usually stored on a smart card that
prevents the creation of more copies, and its use is
17 http://www.openxades.org/.
18 Although note the problems about the long-term
archiving of digital signatures in Stefanie Fischer-
Dieskau and Daniel Wilke, ‘Electronically signed
documents: legal requirements and measures for
their long-term conservation’, Digital Evidence
and Electronic Signature Law Review, 3 (2006) 40
– 44.
19 Technically, PAdES is a file format that is
backwards compatible with the popular PDF.
While the basic PDF standard (ISO 32000)
defines the PKCS#7 format, the PAdES adds
CAdES support to comply with QES requirements.
The file format and file extension is identical.
From the user’s point of view, most PDF
programs should open a PAdES file even if they
cannot fully verify the QES signature.
20 The story of QES largely resembles the Internet
Protocol Security (IPSec) (this is a method for
providing for the security of IP communications
by authenticating and encrypting each IP packet
of a data), that was introduced as complex but
consistent architecture in the early 1990s with
the intent of creating a universal standard for
trust over the internet. Then everyone realised
that the perfect and universal IPSec would not
work with private IP addresses for a private
network developed in accordance with RFC 1918
(Address Allocation for Private Internets). Before
it was understood and became somewhat
interoperable in countless bake-off meetings, the
world had to use something that was not so
perfect, such as Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
(PPTP) (a Microsoft method used to implement a
virtual private network, fatally flawed in the first
versions), and when numerous extensions to
IPSec started to be published, everyone was
annoyed enough to move to SSL VPN (Secure
Sockets Layer Virtual Private Network).
21 Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law
(2nd edn, Tottel, 2007) 4.6.
22 See also Chapter 5 ‘Mechanical instruments: the
presumption of being in order’ in Stephen
Mason, general editor, Electronic Evidence, (2nd
edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) in which this
discussion is considered in detail.
23 Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law
(2nd edn, Tottel, 2007) 4.7 – 4.8; Lorna Brazell,
Electronic Signatures Law and Regulation,
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) 5.045 – 5.046
24 S. C. Rennie and J. R. Rudland, ‘Differences in
medical students’ attitudes to academic
misconduct and reported behaviour across the
years—a questionnaire study’, J Med Ethics
2003; 29:97-102, in which medical students
admitted they would forge signatures on work
submitted (Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures
in Law (2nd edn, Tottel, 2007) 4.9 footnote 1).
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protected by the password that only the person issued
with the private key should know.25 Under Polish law it
is prohibited to use the card and password of another
person under article 47 of Ustawa z dnia 18 września
2001 r. o podpisie elektronicznym – Law of 09.18.2001
on electronic signature:
Art. 47. Kto składa bezpieczny podpis elektroniczny za
pomocą danych służących do składania podpisu
elektronicznego, które zostały przyporządkowane do
innej osoby, podlega grzywnie lub karze pozbawienia
wolności do lat 3 albo obu tym karom łącznie.
Article 47. Anyone who executes a secure electronic
signature using the data for the execution of an
electronic signature which were assigned to another
person shall be liable to a fine or a penalty of
deprivation of liberty for up to three years or both
these penalties jointly.
Certification authorities also require the user to protect
the card and password in the certification service
contract, but in reality, users do not follow this, as
described below in the ZUS case study.26
The hardware itself was significant problem in 2002,
when most readers were connected over RS-232
(Recommended Standard 232) (this is by the Electronic
Industries Association, and is a standard for data and
control signals that connect between data terminal
equipment and data circuit terminating equipment, and
is commonly used in computer serial ports). At the time,
even engineers found it really difficult to have all the
components of a QES working. For instance, a smart
card reader would not work until the user provided the
operating system with the serial port parameters and
installed an item of special software provided by the
vendor – this was a significant usability problem. Most
of the configuration is now automated; if the user
connects the reader, it should work, although the user
must still install the smart card driver software
manually. However, cryptographic card drivers (a driver
is an additional item of software that provides the
interface between the device and the operating system
– drivers are supplied by the vendor in most cases)
remain a problem. This is because smart card drivers
are not installed automatically when the user inserts
the smart card into the reader; which means it will not
work unless the user installs the driver software
provided by the vendor. The intention may not be to
compel the customer to use their particular technology,
but it enables the personalisation of a large number of
smart cards. This problem is exacerbated, because
some vendors do not install PKCS#11 drivers that enable
any user application to work with each other (PKCS#11
is a standard from RSA Security for cryptographic
hardware drivers). Cryptographic API from Microsoft
was the first, vendor specific way for applications to
communicate to a smart card and, for instance, request
the signing of data. Then PKCS#11 was developed, and
now both standards seem to coexist. An increasing
number of vendors now provide PKCS#11 drivers for
their smart cards, but it is not universally true. PKCS#11
is, in general, more interoperable and not bound to an
operating system. Matters are more complex for those
handling qualified certificates for operating systems
other than Windows. In addition to the standard
PKCS#11 interface, they have a built-in JavaCard applet
that provides additional protection; in reality, this
means that it is necessary to have a matching driver
from the vendor to use each card, which causes more
problems of interoperability.
The extent of the technical difficulties that can
prevent ordinary people from using a QES can be
illustrated by the requirement to buy and install a $15
smart card reader. This was one of the proposed
explanations as to why only 5.4 per cent (30,275) of
Estonian citizens that were eligible voted over the
internet in the 2007 elections27 – and this was even
where the majority of Estonian citizens have qualified
certificates as part of their national identity cards,
compared to less than 1 per cent in Poland. According to
Ministerstwo Gospodarki (Ministry of Economics), the
statistics for 2009 indicate that there are around
200,000 active certificates in Poland. With a population
25 An advanced electronic signature must be
protected by complex password that makes it
more difficult to guess by an exhaustive search.
Guessing the password will not work for smart
cards where they are designed to have a fixed
limit of attempts at entering the password
(usually 3), after which the software will block the
use of the card. Obviously, the strength of the QES
still depends on the password in the sense that if
the password is revealed (Post-It stickers,
shoulder surfing, etc) and an attacker obtains
access to the smart card, the link to the signatory
is then lost.
26 For cases where digital signatures have been used
by criminals to transfer funds from company bank
accounts, see Olga I. Kudryavtseva, ‘The use of
electronic digital signatures in banking
relationships in the Russian Federation’, Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5
(2008) 51 – 57, and Olga I. Kudryavtseva, Case
note: Resolution of the Federal Arbitration Court of
Moscow Region of 5 November 2003 Ν ΚΓ-Α
40/8531-03-Π, Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review, 5 (2008) 149 – 151.
27 ‘Internet voting in the March 2007 Parliamentary
Elections in Estonia’, a study directed by Prof.
Alexander H. Trechsel and Robert Schuman in
collaboration with Guido Schwerdt, Dr. Fabian
Breuer, Prof. R. Michael Alvarez and Prof. Thad E.
Hall, (Report for the Council of Europe, 31 July
2007) available at http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/
Coe_and_NEC_Report_E-voting_2007.pdf and
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/drupal/node/140.
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The popular explanation by technicians that security has
its own special requirements has never been valid,
especially when such an assertion is plainly not true. 
of 38 million, this means the take-up is less than 0.5 per
cent of the population. In Estonia, the coverage is over
77 per cent.28
In addition, the immensely complex legal and
organisational requirements to create a qualified
electronic signature caused vendors to design software
and hardware in such a way to ensure the customer
must always buy the same application or product in the
future. For instance, it is practically impossible to install
a qualified certificate on a smart card other than the one
sold by a given certification authority (in Poland the
qualified certification authority must be approved by the
Ministerstwo Gospodarki (Ministry of Economics)), even
if the smart card would satisfy such legal requirements29
as Common Criteria certification30 by SSCD profile at
EAL4 (evaluation assurance level).31 
The way Directive 1999/93/EC has been interpreted
by regulation at the local level, together with the
immaturity of the technology, has resulted in a situation
where it is necessary to devise a separate project for
each business purpose that required smart cards, which
means that each employee is issued with a number of
cards, each tied to different vendor. For example, if a
customer has a compliant smart card from certification
authority 1 (CA 1), and they go to CA 2, then CA 2 will
require the customer to buy their card, rather than
generate the private key on the card they already have
in their possession. This can partially be explained by
an attempt by the vendor to force the customer to buy a
new smart card from them, and partially because of the
incompatibilities described above.
Interoperability summary
All of the challenges mentioned above – lack of format
compatibility, few generic and usable applications (by
an ‘application’ is meant ‘a computer program used by a
user’), the requirement to install software drivers for
both the reader and the card, plus additional difficulties
requiring technical skills (such as those described
below) – make the applications sector that produces
qualified electronic signatures one of the worst in
respect of ease of use. Taken together, these small
annoyances that each separately looked ‘easy’
(engineers) or ‘necessary’ (lawyers) have made the QES
difficult to use.
The popular explanation by technicians that security
has its own special requirements has never been valid,
especially when such an assertion is plainly not true.
For instance, authors of one Polish application
(Elektroniczna Skrzynka Podawcza by Zeto Białystok)
required the user to run a special command line to
change the settings of .NET security policies (this is a
Microsoft programming library or framework that is
used to code the program – the user should never be
required to even touch this), and another one (e-
Deklaracje by the Ministry of Finance) instructed users
to manually change extensions of Adobe AIR programs
(with the same problem as previously described, but
with a different vendor) just to send an electronically
signed file. Neither of these technical design attributes
was caused by the need for security, but rather by the
immaturity of the underlying technology. On the other
hand, vendors did not consider such issues as of any
relevance. For instance, the administration offices in
Poland were required to buy or outsource the Internet
document gateway (ESP) in a relatively short time; it
was formal compliance with law that was a priority, not
the ease of use, even if the average citizen could not
use the software.32
28 Tarvi Martens, ‘Evolution in cross-border
interoperability of eSignatures and eID’, IDABC,
http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/7339#m
artens; the current number of eID cards in
Estonia can be found at
http://www.sk.ee/pages.php/ 020304,1115.
29 As required by Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z
dnia 7 sierpnia 2002 r. w sprawie określenia
warunków technicznych i organizacyjnych dla
kwalifikowanych podmiotów świadczących usługi
certyfikacyjne, polityk certyfikacji dla
kwalifikowanych certyfikatów wydawanych przez
te podmioty oraz warunków technicznych dla
bezpiecznych urządzeń służących do składania i
weryfikacji podpisu elektronicznego (Dz. U. z
dnia 12 sierpnia 2002 r.).
30 http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/.
31 EAL4: Methodically Designed, Tested, and
Reviewed – this standard enables a developer to
provide a degree of assurance for their produce
on the basis of positive security engineering
based on good commercial development
practices.
32 Paweł Krawczyk, ‘Ekscytująco prosta w użyciu
skrzynka podawcza Zeto Białystok’, 21 February
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The conclusion is, that regardless of the optimistic
visions of digital signatures that are presented to users,
the technology will not work if the underlying
technologies are not mature enough to provide stable
products that can be used by lay people. Where the user
has the choice of ugly, counter-intuitive but highly
secure applications that only allowed them to produce a
qualified electronic signature, or their popular office
applications that were not considered approved for
QES, the users simply voted with their feet. The failure
for the QES to be taken up by users has nothing to do
with lack of trust in the internet or old habits, because
the same people use the internet to buy and sell
(auctions, food, clothes, holidays, air travel, to name but
a few) and use internet banking all the time.33
The provisions relating to the QES in Directive
1999/93/EC provide an imperfect attempt at providing
for an almost totally secure method of electronic
signature. But those responsible for producing the QES
fail to understand that the practical issues for both
people and business centre around weighting the cost
and benefits of a specific technical product. The QES,
which is very expensive and a burden to use, provides
highly sophisticated protection against attacks that are
not very relevant for most e-commerce use34 – indeed,
the QES level of security was often figuratively
demonstrated by comparison with the notary services.35
The qualified electronic signature as an
information services preventer
The qualified electronic signature provides a very high
level of security: it offers authenticity, integrity and non-
repudiation (non-repudiation means that it can be
demonstrated that software communicated with
software, not that the person whose private key it was,
was the person responsible for using the key) – but its
history in Europe is the ultimate proof that more
security is not always better. This is because of cost,
which is a direct function of the amount of security. The
cost includes not only the direct cost of buying a
certificate, but also the costs of running an organisation
and the cost of using a QES. In the case of the QES, the
assumed security strength levels make all these costs
relatively high.
The QES was initially intended to make cross-border
business and administration contacts easier and
cheaper, but this objective was lost somewhere on the
way. It is not possible to make things cheaper and
easier with something that is disproportionately
expensive and difficult to use in comparison to the
purpose for which such signatures will be put. For
instance, simple informative services usually require
little or even no authentication of the requesting party
(for instance, checking a VAT number, a business
registration number or a certificate of residence). Where
a user wishes to test the authenticity and integrity of a
source of data, it is usually sufficient to rely on SSL
server authentication or a Web Trust signature built into
a PDF file.36 Even the submission of annual or monthly
tax declarations usually require authentication at a level
not exceeding what is currently used by most internet
banks (password and username), and such levels have
worked for years in the USA37 and UK,38 and now in the
new Polish e-Deklaracje system that no longer requires
QES since 2009, as described below.
One security function that needs to be pointed out
separately is non-repudiation. This is a function that
QES provides at very high level, but it is very expensive.
By non-repudiation, is meant the accumulation of
evidence in respect to the use of the card, and the use
of behaviour modification to force users into changing
their behaviour, thus making it more difficult for a user
to provide a trivial excuse to deny that they were
responsible for initiating a transaction.
The security surrounding the QES provides a high
level of assurance that a QES was affixed to a document
and sent from one computer to another computer over
the internet. Although the concept of single security
mechanism such as the QES is tempting to use from the
point of view of the organisation and in terms of
33 Number of e-banking users in Poland will
probably reach 10 million in 2010, being roughly
one quarter of the whole population: the 2008
prognoses is provided by Zwiàzek Banków
Polskich (Association of Polish Banks).
34 Who cares about strong non-repudiation and
long-term signature validity when requesting a
simple certificate of residence or issuing an
invoice? For a discussion about non-repudiation
in a legal context, see Stephen Mason, Electronic
Signatures in Law (2nd edn, Tottel, 2007) 14.20.
35 Piotr Kolodziejczyk, ‘To prawo i brak chęci
blokują rozwój e-administracji’, Gazeta
Wyborcza, 29 June 2008; the comparison was not
actually a legal or technical equation of notary
signature and QES, but rather a figurative
demonstration of the levels of the strength of
security; this argument was often used against
proponents of QES for e-invoicing who claimed
that security is the priority. Opponents argued
that if security is a priority, all paper invoices
should perhaps be signed before a notary.
36 WebTrust are standard, commercial root
certificates that are built-in to most operating
systems such as Windows – for example VeriSign
and Thawte; everything that is signed with them
can by verified by an average user instantly,
without the need to install any additional root
certificates; for instance, the author’s bank in
Poland (MultiBank) sends a monthly credit card
statement in PDF format with such a signature,
and the Adobe Reader verifies the signature.
37 For instance, courts in the USA have accepted
documents electronically for many years by a
number of providers, one of which is LexisNexis:
http://www.lexisnexis.com/fileandserve/courts/ –
users submit files to court using a password and
username.
38 For instance, HM Revenue and Customs have
accepted electronic submissions for many years,
using passwords and userid:
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/online/index.htm.
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interoperability, the problems and costs associated with
the QES effectively prevents the development of
electronic services, instead of helping to develop them.
This is because each administration has large number of
processes that vary in requirements for the level of
security assurance associated with the QES. Defining a
single security function covering all of the processes an
organisation might want, means that the security level
needs to be adjusted for the most demanding process.
But the ‘one size fits all’ approach means that excess
security is not for free. In particular, the costs of security
for the end user are notoriously ignored. Some Member
States in the EU understood this. E-government services
were begun, such as revenue service declarations,
without a QES. The government gateway in the United
Kingdom started around 2001 with login and password,
and new security features have been subsequently
introduced for users to take up if they wish to.
On the other hand, a large number of trivial
informative processes (such as the issuing of
declarations and certificates) were effectively blocked in
Poland by the strategic decision taken in 2001 that a
QES was the only method that was permitted to
establish trust between the citizen and the government.
Buying a qualified certificate at a cost of US$100 to
request or send a simple declaration made no economic
sense for most citizens, but the administration was not
permitted to use simpler methods, even if they were
considered to be adequate for the purpose.39 The
inability to admit this simple fact resulted in the waste
of public money on an unbelievable scale. By 2008,
most public administration units in Poland were
required to buy or outsource an Internet document
gateway (ESP)40 that only allowed communications with
the use of a QES. The market for qualified certificates
was such that only 0.01 per cent of the population
acquired a qualified certificate, and there was little
economic sense for citizens to buy any more, which
meant that the administration spent millions of euros
for systems that were virtually never used. An ESP
gateway in Krakow (population of 750,000) reported in
2009 that around five electronically signed documents
were being submitted annually since it was installed.41
It follows that official communications still had to
occur, and they continued to be transacted on paper,
not because people were afraid of the internet as some
claimed,42 but because the solution created with the
QES was not easy to use and expensive.
The view that it was only possible to use a qualified
electronic signature was supported by some
certification authorities that acted in various ways to
encourage their use, and requested the government to
create incentives for citizens to use a QES. These efforts
were partially successful. Attempts to liberalise the use
of qualified electronic signatures were effectively
prevented in 2004, when they were first mentioned,
until 2010 when new draft law should be enacted
(Projekt z dnia 23.03.2010 – Ustawa o podpisach
elektronicznych). As result, in 2005 Poland implemented
Directive 2001/115/EC43 and subsequently enacted the
e-invoicing legislation: Rozporzàdzenie Ministra
Finansów z dnia 14 lipca 2005 r. w sprawie wystawiania
oraz przesyłania faktur w formie elektronicznej, which
only permitted the use of the QES and EDI as a means
of authentication. This legislation effectively ensured e-
invoicing did not occur in Poland for some time.
Where the qualified electronic signature
does not work
E-invoicing was introduced to reduce the cost of
traditional invoicing – printing, paper, human work,
postal services etc – and it makes sense only if the cost
is indeed smaller. The QES was introduced to provide
39 The requirement to use a QES was one of the
factors that prevented most citizens interacting
with the otherwise highly useful SEKAP portal in
the Silesia district.
40 Elektroniczna Skrzynka Podawcza (ESP), literally
‘electronic lodgement of documents office’. This
was introduced by Rozporządzenie Prezesa Rady




41 Katarzyna Ponikowska, ‘Podpiszesz bez
długopisu’, 30 November 2009, Echo Miasta
Krakowa, and Paweł Krawczyk, ‘Raport na temat
masowego wykorzystania elektronicznych
skrzynek podawczych’, 21 June 2010, at IPSec.pl.
Estimating the cost of such an ESP at around 15-
25 thousand euros, the return on investment
would produce a large, negative figure. Another
way of assessing the economic efficiency would
be by dividing cost of the ESP by the number of
documents processed. Both estimates suggest
that the example cannot be seen other than as a
shocking waste of public money as result of the
implementation of flawed legislation.
42 The ‘Poles are afraid of Internet’ excuse was
offered for a number of times by various
representatives of the public administration
when asked about the low usage of QES
services. But according to the 2010 Reader’s
Digest study ‘European Trusted Brands’, over 70
per cent of Poles trusted the internet, with a
European average of 49 per cent (a copy is
available from
http://www.rdtrustedbrands.com/).
43 Council Directive 2001/115/EC of 20 December
2001 amending Directive 77/388/EEC with a view
to simplifying, modernising and harmonising the
conditions laid down for invoicing in respect of
value added tax, OJ L15, 17.1.2002, p. 24–28.
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high levels of security, including non-repudiation –
which is arguably irrelevant in the case of e-invoicing.44
E-invoicing is about fast, automated generation and
provision of VAT tax and deduction information. The
objectives of a QES are the opposite – it is necessary to
view the document, unblock the smart card, view the
legal notices (which are substantial) and sign – it is not
possible to make it a fast and automated process.45
The e-invoicing security model centres around the
authenticity of the company of origin, and the integrity46
of the content – and that is all that is required (as
explicitly stated in Directive 2001/115/EC47). The QES
provides for a reasonably strong link to an individual
person and technical non-repudiation. The latter aspect
increases the cost and makes it unsuitable for e-
invoicing. This means the security requirements of e-
invoicing and the features provided by a QES are largely
contrary to what is required.
As mentioned above, Directive 2001/115/EC requires
‘authenticity and integrity’ of an e-invoice, but it does
not require a QES (it merely allows the use of a qualified
electronic signature along with other methods).
However, Polish legislation has chosen the QES-only
approach, also allowing EDI. Supporters of QES-only e-
invoices raised three main types of arguments: the
highest level security is required for customers to trust
e-invoices; any other integrity protection other than QES
will confuse customers, and e-invoices should promote
QES (a circular argument).48
Polish statistics from 200749 indicated that only 5 per
cent of companies were exposed to e-invoicing, and out
of that, most were supermarkets using EDI, and not the
QES. The QES based e-invoicing exchange between
small and medium companies is still practically non-
existent, in that the 5 per cent use is based on the
statistics from the Central Statistical Office – especially
if compared to other countries such as Denmark, where
it is over 60 per cent.50
Instead of the promised savings and increase in the
take-up of electronic invoicing, a number of pathological
business practices started to appear to work around the
flawed legislation.
From 2009, several companies with a large end-user
base, such as Telekomunikacja Polska S.A., started to
issue e-invoices using a QES, because they presumably
saw it as a way to reduce the costs while preserving the
legal requirement to provide the invoice to consumers.
But the increased value of security was questionable
because of how it was implemented. Consumers
received an unsigned PDF with the invoice in one file
and a detached QES signature in another file. The
signature could be verified only by using a special
program from the vendor, which meant the users merely
looked at the unsigned PDF and ignored the signature
file. This is a perfect example of how the
implementation of security can be perfectly legal and
perfectly useless in reality. Other companies on the
other hand, especially small and medium size
companies, resolved the problem of the restrictive e-
invoice regulations by exchanging plain, unsigned PDF
files by e-mail, which the recipient printed and dealt
with as if they received the invoice as a paper invoice
44 There can be a significant requirement for non-
repudiation (that is, proof that data was sent to
and from computers). For example, there are a
number of corporate banks and investment funds
in Poland (e.g. Nordea, Fortis) which seem to
make their clients use a digital signature (not
necessarily a QES) intentionally, to reduce the
risk of a claim by the customer that they were not
responsible for sending the communication in
the event of a failed investment or late payment
(but see the Russian cases: Olga I. Kudryavtseva,
‘The use of electronic digital signatures in
banking relationships in the Russian Federation’,
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law
Review, 5 (2008) 51 – 57; Olga I. Kudryavtseva,
Case note: Resolution of the Federal Arbitration
Court of Moscow Region of 5 November 2003 Ν
ΚΓ-Α 40/8531-03-Π, Digital Evidence and
Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008) 149 –
151.) For a short time there was lobbying to
enforce this at consumer banks, but it stopped
very quickly when the banks realised it would
effectively stop all consumer internet banking in
Poland. In 2008 a number of experts, including
representatives of Nordea bank and PIIT (Polska
Izba Informatyki i Telekomunikacji – a telecom
chamber) praised this solution in the public
media: ‘Banki przesądzą o e-podpisie’, 15 May
2008, Gazeta Wyborcza.
45 Most QES applications require at least six steps
to place a digital signature; longer for
communications with a smart card. A number of
invoices may be signed with one operation, but
this would only work for companies who issue
them once a month, for instance. In addition,
some experts raised a need to use time
stamping, because the certificate is only valid for
two years, and the minimum life time of an
invoice in Poland is five years. Each time stamp
costs money, and takes a few seconds to
complete, especially if a third party service is
used.
46 The simplest means of making an e-invoice
authentic and integral is making it available for
download from an SSL web site, either as
printable text (as Google Europe does) or a PDF
file (as cable operator UPC does). In the long-
term (at least in e-invoicing terms),
authentication and integrity can be provided by
digitally signing the PDF with a commercial
certificate, that can be generated automatically –
many banks sending credit card statements
already use this technique (although note the
comments in Stefanie Fischer-Dieskau and Daniel
Wilke, ‘Electronically signed documents: legal
requirements and measures for their long-term
conservation’, Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review, 3 (2006) 40 – 44).
47 Directive 2001/115/EC requires protection for the
authenticity and integrity of the data, and
presents a relatively open catalogue of technical
means to achieve this, including advanced
signature, QES and EDI.
48 Zbigniew Domaszewicz, Rafał Zasuń, Leszek Baj
‘Konflikt o elektroniczne faktury’, 17 June 2005,
Gazeta Wyborcza;  Zbigniew Domaszewicz, Rafał
Zasuń ‘E-faktury tylko na papierze’, 29 June
2005, Gazeta Wyborcza; Zbigniew Domaszewicz,
‘Minister nauki podpisał rozporządzenie o e-
fakturach’, 14 July 2005, Gazeta Wyborcza.
49 Survey ‘Wykorzystanie technologii informacyjno
telekomunikacyjnych w przedsiębiorstwach’,
(Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, 2007) (‘Use of ICT-in
companies’, Central Statistical Office), available
at http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/
5840_wykorzystanie_ict_PLK_HTML.htm?action=
show_archive; and by 2010 this number has risen
only to 11 per cent, as shown in Itella Information
survey (‘Tylko 11% polskich firm wysyła
elektroniczne faktury’, 16 June 2010, Gazeta
Wyborcza).
50 Sylwia Śmigiel, Piotr Poznański, ‘E-faktura
szansą dla firm’, 1 April 2009, article in Gazeta
Wyborcza.
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through the postal service. If they did not do this, it
would not be possible to deduct the VAT – and it was
virtually impossible for the tax inspector to prove that
the document had not arrived by post.51
A positive example was Denmark where, from 1
February 2005, after creating a usable framework called
OCES, it was made compulsory for both public entities
and their suppliers to use e-invoices.52 Since then, many
countries have followed with flexible and purpose-
oriented e-invoicing legal frameworks (Sweden, Finland,
Italy, as mentioned in the European E-Invoicing Final
Report). As result, more than 60 per cent of all invoices
in use were electronic ones in Denmark as of 2007,
including all invoices exchanged with the public
administration.53 The same applies for Swedish
administration (Svefaktura), where invoicing savings are
estimated at around 365 million euro over 5 years.54
Another case where Polish regulators insisted on the
‘only a QES’ approach, is when they tried to describe
standard requirements for the electronic governmental
gateway (ESP) that issued an electronic confirmation of
reception: ‘Urzędowe Poświadczenie Odbioru’ (UPO)
literally ‘official reception confirmation’. The UPO should
be automatically generated by the system, time-
stamped and signed.55 The problem was how to sign it.
A QES cannot be used without human intervention, and
all previous purpose-driven proposals to establish some
less restrictive forms of signature were rejected based
on the ‘only a QES will be satisfactory’ approach.
Eventually, the regulator was forced to create a separate
class of signatures, not tied to any certification tree,
that are dedicated to signing the UPO.
On the other hand, an example on how giving up a
qualified electronic signature has enabled electronic
services, is the Polish revenue reporting service e-
Deklaracje. When based on QES, its use was marginal
(306 declarations were sent in 200756). In 2009, for the
first time, citizens could send declarations without a
QES57 – the simple sender authentication was based on
the knowledge of the amount of tax paid the previous
year. Even though this was only made available two
weeks before the closing of the annual revenue
reporting period (the end of April), over 90,000 citizens
used it – this was probably by an order of magnitude
more than the sum of any electronic documents sent by
individuals to the administration over the past decade.
In 2010, the number of tax declarations sent this way
was 355,000.58 The number of fraudulent submissions,
jokes and other forms of misbehaviour predicted by the
critics was zero in both years.
ZUS, an example of QES misunderstanding 
ZUS, the Polish social insurance operator, introduced
the digital signature in 1999, because it built a system
that allowed companies to submit employee
declarations electronically. It was initially based on
X.509 certificates issued by an external Certification
Authority on behalf of ZUS. The certificate was assigned
to a company as a whole, it was software based (no
smart card) and issued to companies for free. No design
documents were ever published, but it seemed to work
and to be close to an optimal compromise between
security and usability.
In 2005, for reasons that have never been precisely
explained, the government decided that ZUS would
change over to using qualified electronic signatures.
Obviously, the 200,000 companies that used to send
their declarations to ZUS for free would have to pay for
the certificate. In 2007, just before the conversion, there
51 In June 2009, a decision of the NSA (Naczelny
Sąd Administracyjny) finally ruled that it is legal
to send invoice contents in a PDF by way of e-
mail, print it and treat as a paper invoice –
without using technical means required for fully
electronic invoicing (case I FSK 1444/09). This is,
however, just one ruling in favour of one specific
company and did not reduce the confusion for
the others, as the tax authorities may, but are not
forced to use this ruling in other cases.
52 http://www.epractice.eu/cases/EID.
53 In Denmark, the ‘Act pertaining to public
payments’ was passed in December 2003. For
more on e-invoice regulation, see ‘European E-
Invoicing Final Report’, (European Commission
Informal Task Force on e-Invoicing, 2007, Version
3.2 Final) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
payments/einvoicing/index_en.htm. Among other
observations, the authors noted at page 22 that
‘Given this penchant for overkill in signature
requirements for electronic invoices, it should
come as little surprise that EDI-based solutions
tend to dominate in the market, since it is more
flexible from a legal point of view.’ In addition,
the authors also remarked (page 22) that ‘From
a cross-border perspective, it should be noted
that the necessity of an invoice being legally
valid in both the sender’s and the recipient’s
countries means that the strictest legal regime
will determine the requirements to be met. Thus,
a European e-Invoicing service provider under
these conditions would be confronted with the
arduous task of offering a solution that meets the
most rigid European requirements (at least when
the solution relies on electronic signatures), as
any other solution would risk being invalid in
stricter countries.’




55 ‘Rozporządzenie Prezesa Rady Ministrów z dnia




56 Piotr Skwirowski, ‘Już ponad 10 tys. PIT-ów
złożonych przez internet!’, 15 April 2009, article
in Gazeta Wyborcza.
57 It was possible only because the Ministry of
Finance is not covered by the general regulation
(Kodeks Postępowania Administracyjnego, KPA)
that only allows QES for citizen to government
communications.
58 See the article ‘Z e-PIT skorzystało ponad 355
tys. osób’, Gazeta Prawna, 5 May 2010. The e-
Deklaracje system is not perfect and has many
deficiencies that limited the total number of
people who were able to use it. For the first time,
it used a modern approach based on availability,
rational risk management and an open
specification for the application programming
interface. This approach seems to follow the
attitude expressed in European Commission
Decision 2009/767/EC, which also recommends
usage of QES only where ‘high level of security is
needed’ and after performing ‘risk analysis’.
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were less than 10,000 active qualified certificates sold
by Polish certification centres, most of which were
bought by the public administration or organisations
that were required to use QES by law in some part of
their activities (for example, notaries and banks).
After the conversion, which is a perfect example of a
market created by the government, the rush for
qualified certificates started in 2008 and reached
around 200,000 certificates, where it is now.59 Contrary
to what the people that advocated the use of qualified
electronic signatures predicted, this enforced ‘stimulus’
did not cause an increase in interest among individuals,
even if the ESP gateways mentioned above already
existed (neither did it cause a predicted decline in the
prices of qualified certificates). The estimated cost of
the conversion for the private sector – ignored by most
people speaking on this subject – was between 15 and
24 million euro, with an additional cost of 10 million
euro annually. The cost of the conversion for ZUS is
unknown.
The decision caused an avalanche of problems,
apparently never predicted by whoever made the
decision. First, the QES is associated with an individual
person. For business continuity purposes, companies
were advised to buy not one, but several certificates to
ensure the declarations can be still sent if someone is
not available because they are on leave, sick or
otherwise not available. Large companies had to buy
several certificates, to the amusement of companies
selling certificates. Small companies did the opposite.
To save money, they had one certificate, and everyone
knew the password, making the whole QES model look
like an amusing spectacle for laughter.
Second, a QES is issued to a named individual, so
there is an assumption that when the QES is used, it
was the person whose QES it is, who caused the
signature to be affixed to the data. Now, ZUS knew with
the highest confidence assured by a QES that Jan
Kowalski purportedly sent a declaration for Acme, but
ZUS did not know what relation Jan Kowalski was to
Acme.60 Jan Kowalski could be the company’s
accountant, the external accountant or a complete
stranger, and ZUS had no way of knowing this.61
When this was first raised as an opportunity for
forgery, ZUS correctly explained that it does not create
any reasonable risk of forgery. Shortly after that, ZUS
apparently decided that this gap, however, created a
risk for the internal integrity of the data, and in 2009
introduced the idea that companies start buying
attribute certificates62 to confirm the relation between a
physical person and a legal entity. In the meantime, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (MSWiA)
announced that ZUS could potentially use a new, non-
QES technique for authentication called a ‘trusted
profile’,63 that should go into production by the end of
2010. If this works, the QES ‘silver bullet’64 for ZUS
would make a full circle to the point where it came from
– back on a very bumpy and very expensive road
indeed.
Conclusions
The QES does not solve all the issues between the
administration, citizens and business regarding the
trust to be given to its use. The qualified electronic
signature is a high security and expensive technique
suitable for relatively small set of business processes,
probably slightly below the notary signature in the
paper world. Large reports such as CROBIES65 have a
lot of exciting legal and technical discussions, but no
solutions for the simple needs of citizens that have
nothing to do with information technology. With the
endless theoretical and legal discussions, it is possible
that some EU Member States will continue to discuss a
second or even a third wave of e-signaturism.66
If, after twenty years of X.509 and ten years of
advanced electronic signatures, all the items set out in
the CROBIES diagram entitled ‘Key success factors of
eSignatures’ are red and marked as ‘insufficient’ or
‘inappropriate’,67 then it means that the concept ought
to be reconsidered, and it cannot be resolved by slightly
changing interpretations of Directive 1999/93/EC.
Perhaps it is time to rethink the whole concept of the
59 Unizeto, ‘Kalendarium e-podpisu w Polsce’, 
2009.
60 The company name is optional in the Polish
qualified certificate profile.
61 Qualified certificates sold in Poland can contain
company name but they are not guaranteed,
even if the company sponsors the certificate. At
some point, some certification authorities started
to discourage certificates with a company name
because this would potentially create issues
when a certificate is used for personal purposes.
62 RFC 3281 – An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile
for Authorization http://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc3281.txt. While a X.509 certificate binds an
identity to a cryptographic key in a certified
manner, the attribute certificates are third-party
certified confirmation of something that the
person is allowed to do.
63 ‘Zaufany profil’ (‘trusted profile’) – a new single
sign-on like technique for identity federation in
the public administration services. Little details
are known about this at the time of writing, but it
will be most probably based on non-qualified
digital signature and SAML (Security Assertions
Markup Language).
64 The term ‘silver bullet’ is a colloquial term that is
often used to express the view that the invention
will solve all the problems.
65 CROBIES - Study on Cross-Border Interoperability
of eSignatures:
http://www.sealed.be/reports.htm.
66 Editor’s note: much of the legal discussion in the
reports issued by the EU only concentrate on
digital signatures (also known as advanced
electronic signatures), and significantly fail to
mention any of the relevant case law relating to
all the forms of electronic signature that are
reported in this journal and set out in Stephen
Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (2nd edn,
Tottel, 2007).
67 Study on Cross-Border Interoperability of
eSignatures (CROBIES), Head Document, Figure
2, page 10 (version 1.0 29.3.10).
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Directive.
The present legal framework has approached
electronic signatures by attempting to build a ‘universal
theory of everything’ and too little discussion has been
given to the forms of electronic signatures that are
actually used every day, and to technical products that
act to help provide for security. Even if the ‘what authors
of Annex III really meant’ type casuistry is finished with
a consensus by the experts (whoever they may be) at
around 2020, no one will be interested in the solution.
The world will have move forward, new problems will
appear, and by that time any potential savings to be
obtained from simpler solutions that could have been
provided quickly will have failed to be made.
This article sets out a number of reasons why the
qualified electronic signature alone is never going to
work. The various products based on the model of
Directive 1999/93/EC – advanced signature, advanced
signature with qualified certificate and the latter with
SSCD – can all be considered options, depending on
how much security is required by a given process.
Processes should be designed in respect of the
purpose, not the other way around. Risk analysis and
cost-benefit analysis should be used to select adequate
techniques and then they should be amended by how
easy they are to use and common sense.
There are some good examples in the Commission
activities relating to electronic authentication. The first
was the Commission Decision 2009/767/EC mentioned
above. Another is the IDABC Authentication Policy, a
document that was published in 2004 as part of
IDABC,68 and the aim of the document is to demonstrate
the purpose of authentication and how it can be used
for useful services. In the Policy, the European
Commission produced reasonable guidelines to
establish controls that are proportional for generic
public administration processes that can be used as a
template for the design of the establishment of trust for
public or private systems.69 The European
Interoperability Framework70 is another good set of
guidelines that can be used to form usable services and
– eventually – to start making individual lives easier.
© Paweł Krawczyk, 2010
68 IDABC (Interoperable Delivery of European
eGovernment Services to public Administrations,
Businesses and Citizens); ‘European
Interoperability Framework for Pan-European
eGoverment Services’, version 1.0 which apaers
to be the ‘final’ version
http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/3473/58
69 The document contains a consistent sequence of
organisational and technical controls, starting
from registration of users up to their
authentication as they use the system. All typical
techniques are taken into account – passwords,
one time passwords, software signature and
hardware signature. All are assigned relative
security strengths. A list of business processes is
produced and assigned relative security
requirements. At the end, these two lists are
matched.
70 European Interoperability Framework 2.0 (draft)
http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/7728.
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